Message Text

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UNCLAS TAIPEI 3771

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FOR: IOR/ MEDIA REACTION; IEA

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SUBJECT: PRESS REACTION REPORT

REF: TAIPEI 3770

- 1. SUMMARY: IN SIGNIFICANT EDITORIAL LEADING CHINA TIMES JUNE 25 FOLLOWED UP JUNE 23 FRONTPAGED WASHINGTON DATELINED REPORT QUOTING RICHARD SNEIDER ON WASHINGTON-PEKING RELATIONS AND FUTURE STATUS U. S. TAIPEI EMBASSY (SEE REFTEL). EDITORIAL SAID PEKING'S PRO- U. S. POLICY HAD REACHED DEAD END AND ROC WAS BEGINNING TO SEE LIGHT AT END OF TUNNEL. END SUMMARY
- 2. CHINA TIMES JUNE 25 EDITORIAL: "... IN SEEKING U. S. FRIENDSHIP, THE MAOISTS HAVE WALKED TOO FAST ON THE PATH OF SO- CALLED NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS... BEFORE LONG, FACTS WILL PROVE THE MAOISTS HAVE DRUNK A CUP OF BITTER WINE... SNEIDER'S CONVERSATION SERVE TO DISPEL ABOUNDING SPECULATIONS ON ROC- U. S. RELATIONS. HE UNEQUIVOCALLY PLEDGED THAT, AS AMBASSADOR MACCONAUGHY WILL UNCLASSIFIED

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SOON RETIRE, THE UNITED STATES WILL UNDOUBTEDLY APPOINT A SUCCEEDING AMBASSADOR, AND THAT THE U. S. EMBASSY IN TAIPEI WILL NOT UNDERGO ANY CHANGE.

- 3. " LET US FRANKLY POINT OUT THAT IT IS A MISTAKE FOR THE MAOISTS TO AGREE TO LET AMERICA MAINTAIN DIPLOMATIC AND DEFENSE RELATIONS WITH ROC BEFORE 'THE CHINESE PEOPLE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE TAIWAN STRAITS' HAVE SOLVED THEIR OWN PROBLEM. IT IS ALSO ANOTHER MISTAKE FOR THE MAOISTS TO ASK FOR THE MUTUAL ESTABLISHMENT OF GOVERNMENT- TO- GOVERNMENT LIAISON OFFICES AT A TIME WHEN U. S. - ROC DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER FRIENDLY RELATIONS STILL EXIST. FOR THE MAOISTS. THE TEMPORARY THREAT FROM THE NORTH CAN AT MOST CAUSED PHYSICAL INJURY. THE WILL FOR FREEDOM OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ROC AND THE 15 MILLION PEOPLE ON TAIWAN, PLUS THE ENTIRE CHINESE NATION THEY UNITE AND REPRESENT, IS THE REAL COUP DE GRACE FOR THE MAOISTS. OF COURSE, THE MAOISTS HAD THEIR OWN PLANS WHEN THEY DECIDED ON SUCH A POLICY. PEIPING THOUGHT THAT THE ANTI- COMMUNIST WILL OF THE FREE CHINESE AT HOME AND ABROAD UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF ROC GOVERNMENT COULD BE SHATTERED BY ITS UNITED- FRONT CAMPAIGN. IT THOUGHT THAT THE UNITED STATES MIGHT ALSO PLAY A ROLE FAVORABLE TO PEIPING IN THE PROCESS OF SETTLING THE SO- CALLED TAIWAN QUESTION.
- 4. " NOW FACTS PROVE THAT THE MAOISTS ARE WRONG. PEIPING HAS NEGLECTED THE CHECK AND BALANCE UNDERLINED IN PWER POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY. THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION, WITH ITS GOAL OF ESTABLISHING A PEACE OF MULTI- POWER BALANCE. HAS NO REASON TO LET THE MAOISTS BECOME SO STRONG AS TO MAKE THE 800 MILLION PEOPLE GIVE UP THEIR HOPE AND SUFFER COMMUNIST ENSLAVEMENT WITHOUT COMPLAINT. MORE FATALLY, PEIPING FAILED TO EVALUATE CORRECTLY THE CHANGES IN THE DYNAMIC RELATIONS - WITH AMERICA AS THE CENTER - BETWEEN AMERICAN AND THE SOVIETS, AND AMERICA AND THE MAOISTS. OF COURSE, PEIPING HAS ALSO UNDERESTIMATED THE ANTI- COMMUNIST WILL AND DETERMINATION OF THE FREE CHINESE AND THE ROC GOVERN-MENT. WHAT WE SEE NOW IS THE VOICEFEROUS CHANTING BY THE MAOISTS FOR SO- CALLED IDENTIFICATION AND RETURN TO MOTHERLAND. TO NO PRACTICAL AVAIL. PEIPING'S RELATIONS UNCLASSIFIED

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WITH THE UNITED STATES, THOUGH IMPROVED SLIGHTLY, ARE NO MATCH FOR THE STRONGER DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE OF THE SOVIETS. ACTUALLY, PEIPING IS NOW SITUATED IN A MORE ADVERSE POSITION POLITICALLY AND STRATEGICALLY.

5. "... WHEN KISSINGER VISITED PEIPING FOR THE FIFTH
TIME THIS FEBRUARY AND REACHED AS ACCORD ON THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF LIAISON OFFICES, THIS PAPER POINTED OUT THAT THE
ARRANGEMENT SIGNIFIED THE KEY TO FUTURE CHANGES IN WORLD
EVENTS. JUDGING FROM THE TRIANGULAR RELATIONSHIP AMONG
THE UNITED STATES, SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE MAOISTS, AS WELL
AS THE INTERNAL SITUATION OF PEIPING, OUR FAITH HAS BEEN
FURTHER STRENGTHENED. PUTTING THE WORLD SITUATION INTO

PERSPECTIVE, WE BELIEVE THAT, THOUGH OUR NATIONAL SITUATION HAS YET TO BE FULLY SECURED, THE LIGHT AT THE OTHER END OF THE TUNNEL SHOULD NOT BE TOO FAR AWAY IF WOULD EVENTS CONTINUE TO DEVELOP IN THIS DIRECTION."

CLARKE

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